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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DANIEL L. CARTER, : Case No. 20051149-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Defendant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). The Honorable Judge, Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah entered a judgment of conviction for Tax Evasion—Intent to Evade (tax 
evasion), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(d) 
(Supp. 2003), and Tax Evasion—Filing a False or Fraudulent Return or Statement (filing 
a false tax return), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1101(l)(c) (Supp. 2003), on November 18, 2005.l See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, and Commitment). 
1
 This brief cites to the 2003 version of section 76-8-1101. Section 76-8-1101 was 
amended once during the charged years, on July 1, 2001, but the amendment does not 
affect this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
L Issue Presented by Standby Counsel:2 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's proposed jury 
instruction (instruction 50) which explained the relevant law in relation to his defense. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed 
jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,18, 72 P.3d 692, cert denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 274:74-79. 
II. Issues Presented by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra note 2, herein): 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's proposed jury 
instructions which explained the relevant law in relation to his defense. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury 
2
 The trial court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") to serve as 
standby counsel for Daniel Carter, while he represented himself in the criminal 
proceedings. (See infra "Statement of the Case," herein.) LDA continues to represent 
Carter in that capacity. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^15,16, 979 P.2d 799 (an 
accused may defend him- or herself in criminal proceedings, including on appeal); see 
also Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a state 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to present pro se briefs and motions on appeal); 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). In that capacity, LDA has raised one issue 
on appeal, which is identified as the issue and argument of "Standby Counsel." The 
manner in which LDA and Carter have proceeded with this brief in presenting Carter's 
pro se issues and arguments "comports with sound and fair procedure" and the rules of 
procedure. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981); Utah R. App. P. 24. 
Moreover, this approach is appropriate, as an Anders brief is inapplicable here 
because standby counsel has not reached the conclusion that "an indigent client's appeal 
is without merit." Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967); see also State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,^ |6 n.3, 72 P.3d 692 (approving this 
procedure as an appropriate channel to present both pro se and standby counsel issues as 
long as the brief comports with the rules). 
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instruction constitutes error is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Smith, 
2003UTAppl79at^|8. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 274:73-82. 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's pre-trial motion to 
dismiss which argued that because Carter had no income for federal income tax purposes, 
he had no income for state income tax purposes either, and therefore he had no income 
tax liability under Utah law. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court erred in denying a pre-trial motion to 
dismiss is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Marshall 2003 UT 
App 381,1(8, 81 P.3d 775, cert denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 273. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following is in Addendum B: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV - Due Process of Law; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 - Due Process of Law; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004) - Definition of State Taxable Income; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (Supp. 2003) - Tax Evasion; Filing False Return. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Daniel L. Carter ("Carter") was charged by amended criminal information with 
one count of filing a false tax return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (Supp. 2003), and one count of tax evasion, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(d) (Supp. 2003). R. 240-41. The 
3 
trial court appointed LDA to represent Carter in the matter. R. 9-10; 16. However, the 
trial court ruled Carter could represent himself in the proceedings and appointed LDA to 
serve as standby counsel to Carter in the case. R. 273:3. Carter filed a motion to dismiss 
on April 21, 2005. R. 69-76. Following a hearing on April 22, 2005, the trial court 
denied Carter's motion. R. 69-76; 273. 
On June 27, 2005, the trial court commenced a jury trial in the matter. R. 274. In 
his opening statement, Carter said the jury should acquit him because "state taxable 
income means federal taxable income" and the prosecution could not show he "made 
federal taxable income." R. 274:19-20. In his closing argument, Carter again stated 
"state tax return is totally based on the federal tax return," and argued the jury should 
acquit him because he "simply filed returns reporting [his] state taxable income to be the 
same amount as [his] federal taxable income as Utah law requires." Id. at 168-69. 
Following deliberations, the jury found Carter guilty as charged. R. 242-43; 274:174. 
Thereafter, on November 18, 2005, the trial judge sentenced Carter to an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the filing a false tax return 
count and an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison for the tax evasion count. R. 249-51; 275. The prison sentences 
were ordered to run concurrently. Id. The trial court also ordered Carter to pay $10,125 
in restitution, a $400 recoupment fee, and a $2,500 fine plus interest and surcharge. Id. 
Carter filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 256. He is challenging the rulings of the lower 
court as they relate to the trial proceedings. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state charged Carter with tax crimes under sections §§ 76-8-1101 (l)(c) and 
1101(l)(d). R. 2-5. Carter filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court on April 21, 
2005. R. 69-76. In the motion to dismiss, Carter argued he had not failed to render 
proper tax returns for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 because returns were prepared and 
received by the commission. Id at 70-71. Additionally, he asserted he is not liable for 
state income taxes since, according to his interpretation of the law, state tax liability is 
dependent upon federal tax liability, and he in fact had no federal tax liability. Id. at 71. 
Second, Carter argued he is not liable for federal or state income taxes because the 
federal tax code does not contain a liability section for assessment or payment of federal 
income taxes. Id Consequently, he maintained that because the federal tax code lacks a 
liability section, he is not liable for federal income taxes. Id Third, Carter argued he 
made no income as defined by the United States Supreme Court. He maintains that 
income is strictly defined as a corporate gain or profit. Id at 72. As a result, he argued 
that because he does not make a corporate gain or profit and he is not incorporated, his 
wages do not constitute income for income tax purposes. Id Finally, Carter argued he 
lacked the necessary intent to be charged with tax evasion. Id at 74-75. 
The trial court conducted a motion hearing regarding Carter's motion to dismiss 
on April 22, 2005. R. 86-93. The trial court did not have the motion to dismiss in its 
possession until the motion hearing and did not read the motion before ruling, but instead 
ruled solely on Carter's articulated rationale at the motion hearing. R. 273:6. The trial 
court denied Carter's motion to dismiss and the matter was set for a jury trial with Carter 
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continuing to represent himself in a pro se capacity with appointed counsel continuing on 
as standby counsel. R. 273; 274. 
The jury trial was held on June 27, 2005. R. 274. At trial, the State's witness 
conceded on cross-examination that the Utah Code "says, 'The state taxable income in 
the case of a resident individual means his federal taxable income5"; and that a person 
cannot, "according to Utah law, have state taxable income" if he "has no federal taxable 
income." R. 274:97. 
Carter submitted several requested jury instructions to the trial court. R. 112-121. 
Relevant to this appeal, he submitted an instruction that read: 
In order to convict the defendant of the charge, the offenses charged in the 
Information, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
1. The defendant was liable for paying income taxes; and 
2. During the relevant time period the defendant made state taxable 
income and not just wages. Unless the prosecution can demonstrate that 
all wages are taxable income. 
R. 113; 274:73. The trial court refused to give this instruction. R. 274:73. The next 
instruction submitted by Carter, labeled by the trial court as instruction 50, stated: 
You are instructed that under Utah law that state taxable income in the case 
of a resident individual means his federal taxable income. Since Utah law 
also requires the reporting of federal income, reported on Federal Form TC-
40 as the taxpayer's state taxable income, it is essential that the prosecution 
prove that the defendant made federal taxable income. 
R. 114; 274:74. 
The trial court requested the state's position on instruction 50 to which the state 
responded: 
Mr. Baer: I object because we have already heard testimony that's not the 
fact and that's not the state of the law. 
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The Court: I can't hear you. 
Mr. Baer: I'm sorry. It's not the state of the law. Independent obligation 
under State versus Smith and State versus Jensen both cases, I have copies 
for the Court if the Court wishes, very, very, clearly states in both of these, 
they're the seminal cases here, that filing a federal return is not a 
prerequisite to a Utah obligation. 
The Court: All right. I'm not giving 50, it's denied. 
R. 274:74-75. 
Standby counsel then proffered the following about instruction 50: 
Mr. Sikora: Again, Mr. Carter, I believe, is not - - the argument there is it's 
federal taxable income that has to be shown that he owed, not that he filed a 
federal tax return. And I think that's the distinction that he would make, 
that income is not the tax return, that this instruction doesn't have anything 
to do with having previously filed a tax return, a federal tax return as a 
predicate or a prerequisite to filing a state taxable income, a state tax return. 
That's not what he's saying. 
The Court: I don't understand what you're saying. Could you give me one 
more shot at it. 
Mr. Sikora: If I heard correctly, Mr. Baer - -
The Court: Mr. Baer I think mischaracterized it. But what do you think it 
really says? 
Mr. Sikora: What I believe that instruction say[s] [sic] is that Carter 
actually has to owe, or has to have adjusted gross income on his federal 
taxes to pay federal taxes and that's what the prerequisite is to filing his - -
to not filing a state tax return but paying state taxes. 
Trial Court: Okay. 
Mr. Sikora: Because of the fact that you have to put your adjusted income 
from your federal income tax return on your state income tax return. 
The Court: All right. I understand. I am not giving it. Obviously, he 
chose not to file a correct federal tax return. That doesn't relieve him of the 
burden of filing a proper state tax return. 
Id at 75-76. 
Finally, the trial court and Carter had the following additional discussion 
concerning instruction 50: 
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, if I had filed an—If I had filed improper federal 
tax return, they have had six years to take— 
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The Court: They'll be after you, sir, after. You can't argue that— 
Mr. Carter: Six years. 
The Court: You cannot argue that. If you think for one minute that you 
can say that you are not going to pay federal income tax and it's not going 
to come due and owing, you're mistaken. 
Mr. Carter: If I'm not liable for federal income tax? 
The Court: Why would you not be liable? 
Mr. Carter: Because there's no liability section in the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
The Court: Why is everybody else liable for paying taxes and you not? 
Mr. Carter: I could show you the liability section for every tax in this code 
except for the—if you— 
The Court: You tell me. 
Mr. Carter: —taxes, Your Honor. 
The Court: What is the basis for you saying you don't owe federal income 
tax when everybody else does? 
Mr. Carter: Everybody else doesn't if they are not liable under the— 
The Court: Well, when the rest of us are paying on our wages, why don't 
you have to pay it? 
Mr. Carter: I'm following the tax code. 
The Court: Why? Tell me why. Why you don't have to pay federal taxes? 
Mr. Carter: Because I am not liable for them and the Supreme Court are 
telling us— 
The Court: Why are you not liable for them? 
Mr. Carter: Because I don't make income for income tax purposes. The 
Supreme Court, Your Honor— 
The Court: What do you mean, you don't make income for income tax 
purposes? 
Mr. Carter: The Supreme Court has determined that income means a 
corporate profit for income tax purposes. 
The Court: That's not the law. In fact, if you have a case you can show it 
to me. 
Mr. Carter: I do, a few of them. 
The Court: Well, let's see it. 
Mr. Carter: In Merchants versus— 
The Court: I want to see the case. 
Mr. Carter: Well, I don't have the complete case but I— 
The Court: Well, then it's not helpful to me. No, if it's not the complete 
case, it's not helpful. You can read the name of the case into the record, 
you can summarize what you believe the case says. What's the name of the 
case? What do you believe it says? 
Mr. Carter: In Merchants Loan & Trust versus Utonka, 255 US 509, at 
pages 518 and 519, the Court held that, quote: The word income must be 
8 
given the same meaning in all of the income tax acts of Congress, those 
given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. There's other court 
cases, Your Honor, that talk about income meaning the corporate profit as 
in (inaudible). 
Id. at 76-79. Concluding "[ijncome is not limited to a corporate profit," the trial court 
again refused to give instruction 50. Id. at 79. 
Carter also submitted instruction 52, which read: 
In order to convict the defendant of tax evasion, the prosecution must show 
that the defendant knew he was liable for payment of state income taxes, 
but sought to "intentionally evade" paying them. 
R. 117; 274:79-80. The State argued this instruction should be rejected because "the term 
knew . . . sort of lofts" this instruction "into a good faith defense, what he knew." R. 
274:80. "And he is not entitled to a good faith defense under State versus Smith and a 
number of other cases. I think the prosecution has to show that the defendant was liable 
for the payment of state income taxes but intentionally evade[d] paying it, that goes to the 
mens rea element of intent." Id The trial court denied this instruction because it was 
already covered as "one of the elements" of tax evasion. Id. 
At the close of trial, standby counsel renewed the defense's "exceptions that we've 
already made on the instructions that you have denied." R. 274:139. The trial court then 
instructed the jury and read the following instruction twice, as instructions 26 and 27: 
Tax liability arises from the earning of income and not from the assessment 
of tax liability by the federal government. The duty to file a federal return 
is not a predicate element of either state income tax evasion or the willful 
failure to file a state income tax return. 
R. 222 223; 274:155. Following deliberation, the jury convicted Carter of both charges. 
R. 236-237. This appeal follows. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL 
A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury and to 
have the jury instructed accordingly. Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion by rejecting 
an instruction proposed by a defendant unless the instruction incorrectly states the law, 
has no reasonable basis in the evidence, or is properly covered in other instructions. In 
this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to give instruction 50. 
First, instruction 50 accurately described the law because state taxable income is 
defined by statute as federal taxable income with modifications, subtractions, and 
adjustments. Second, instruction 50 had a reasonable basis in the evidence because 
Carter rested his defense on his belief that he did not owe state income tax because state 
taxable income is calculated based on federal taxable income and, according to his 
interpretation of the federal tax code, he did not make any federal taxable income. Third, 
instruction 50 was not properly covered by the instructions given because none of the 
instructions given explained to the jury that state taxable income is calculated based on 
federal taxable. Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's refusal to 
give instruction 50 prejudiced Carter by insufficiently advising the jury of the law, 
thereby misleading the jury as to the merits of Carter's defense. 
10 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL3 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 50 AND THIS RESULTED IN 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
"Under the due process provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions, a 
'"defendant [is] afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"" 
State v.Anderson, 2004 UT App 129, 2004 WL 1368332, *1 (citing State v. Garcia, 965 
P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 
Specifically, due process guarantees a "defendant has the right to present his or her 
theory of the case to the jury and to have the jury instructed accordingly." State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1f21, 52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). "Failure to 
give" a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error if omission of the 
instruction "tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT 
App 13,1(17, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation omitted). 
In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion 
when it refused to give Carter's requested jury instruction 50 and the trial court's abuse 
of discretion resulted in prejudicial error. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REJECTING 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 50, WHICH EXPLAINED THAT IN 
ORDER TO SHOW INCOME TAX LIABILITY THE PROSECUTION HAD TO 
PROVE CARTER ACTUALLY MADE FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME. 
"A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury and to 
3
 See supra note 2, herein. 
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have the jury instructed accordingly." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at <fl21. He also has the right to 
have his "'theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way.'" 
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted), aff d on other 
grounds, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). A defendant does not, however, "have the right to 
improperly instruct the jury," Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at <pi; or to give an instruction "which 
cdoes not comport with the facts presented or does not accurately state the applicable 
law.5" Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "'a defendant is not entitled 
to an instruction which is redundant or repetitive of principles enunciated in other 
instructions given to the jury.'" State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,^19, 4 P.3d 778 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting an 
instruction proposed by the defendant "where the instruction incorrectly states the law," 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at *|21 (citations omitted); has no "reasonable basis in the evidence," 
State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986); or "is properly covered in other 
instructions," Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^ 21 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to give instruction 50. 
First, instruction 50 accurately described the law. The Utah Code defines state 
taxable income as "federal taxable income . . . with modifications, subtractions, and 
adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004).4 In 
other words, if a person has no federal taxable income then, by default, he also has no 
4
 The 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 is cited in this brief. No amendments 
were made to this section during the charged years. This section was amended in 2006; 
12 
state taxable income. See Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992) 
("The [Utah] Code imposes a tax on a Utah resident's federal taxable income with certain 
adjustments." (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-14A-5, -11 (1974); §§ 59-10-104, -112 
(1987)).5 In fact, at trial, the State's witness conceded a person cannot, "according to 
Utah law, have state taxable income" if he "has no federal taxable income." R. 274:97. 
In instruction 50, Carter simply requested an instruction explaining this legal concept: 
"You are instructed that under Utah law," because a person's "taxable income . . . means 
his federal taxable income," the prosecution is required to "prove that the defendant made 
federal taxable income." R. 114; 274:74. If the trial court believed the instruction did 
not clearly state this legal concept, as implied by the colloquy preceding its rejection of 
the instruction, then it should have offered another instruction that would have more 
clearly explained the legal concept. See Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615. 
Second, instruction 50 had a reasonable basis in the evidence. In this case, Carter 
filed returns for each of the charged years. R. 274:23-24, 40-46. In these returns, he 
reported he did not owe any state income tax because he did not make any federal taxable 
income. Id He also attached a page from his federal tax return to each of his state tax 
returns, purporting to demonstrate his lack of federal taxable income. Id Then, at trial, 
Carter rested his defense on his belief that he did not owe state income tax because state 
taxable income is calculated based on federal taxable income and he did not make any 
federal taxable income. R. 274:19-20, 58-63, 96-100, 110, 118, 120-21, 167-69. 
however, this amendment does not affect Carter's analysis. 
5
 The statutory language quoted by Jensen remains substantively the same. See, e.g. Utah 
n 
Regardless of the jury's ultimate conclusion as to whether Carter was correct in his 
assertion that he did not make any federal taxable income, it should have been instructed 
that the first prong of Carter's defense, that state income tax is calculated from federal 
taxable income, was correct. See Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. By not providing such an 
instruction, the trial court left the jury free, if it chose, to inappropriately count Carter's 
claim that a person does not owe state income tax if he makes no federal taxable income 
as evidence that Carter was attempting to evade a tax by misstating the law. See supra at 
Part. LB. 
Third, instruction 50 was not properly covered by the instructions given. None of 
the instructions given explained to the jury that state taxable income is defined as "federal 
taxable income . . . with modifications, subtractions, and adjustments." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-10-112. Rather, the jury was instructed twice, in instructions 26 and 27, that "[t]ax 
liability arises from the earning of income and not from the assessment of tax liability by 
the federal government. The duty to file a federal return is not a predicate element of 
either state income tax evasion or the willful failure to file a state income tax return." R. 
222 223; 274:155. It is true "the duty to file a federal tax return is not a predicate element 
of either state income tax evasion, or the willful failure to file a state income tax return." 
Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at «|25. In other words, the State is not required to prove the 
defendant "was required to file a federal income tax return for [the charged year]." Id. at 
<|24. However, this does not change the legal reality that the Utah Code calculates state 
taxable income based on "a Utah resident's federal taxable income with certain 
Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004). 
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adjustments." Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. The added emphasis of instructing the jury twice 
that the duty to file a federal tax return is irrelevant to tax evasion and failure to file, 
combined with the lack of an instruction informing the jury that state taxable income is 
calculated from federal taxable income, left the false impression that federal taxable 
income is irrelevant to calculating state taxable income. Id.; R. 222 223; 274:155. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting instruction 50 
because the absence of instruction 50 resulted in Carter's defense not being presented to 
the jury in a "clear and understandable way." Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615. In fact, the 
absence of instruction 50 served to undermine Carter's defense by allowing the jury to 
falsely conclude Carter's assertion that state taxable income is calculated from federal 
taxable income was untrue and served as evidence that Carter was trying to evade taxes 
by misstating the law. See supra at Part LB. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 50 PREJUDICED CARTER'S CASE. 
"Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if 
their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law.'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 
at [^17 (citations omitted). In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court's 
refusal to give instruction 50 prejudiced Carter by insufficiently advising the jury of the 
law, thereby misleading the jury as to the merits of Carter's defense. Id. 
In order to prove Carter guilty of tax evasion and filing a false tax return, the State 
had to prove he had an intent to evade. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c), (l)(d). 
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Carter's defense was that he did not have an intent to evade; rather, he acted under a 
strongly-held belief that he did not owe any state income tax because state taxable 
income is calculated based on federal taxable income and, according to his personal 
reading of the federal tax code, he did not have any federal taxable income. R. 274:19-
20, 58-63, 96-100, 110, 118, 120-21, 167-69. In other words, Carter's defense rested on 
his interpretation of tax law. Id. The more outrageous his interpretation, the more likely 
the jury would conclude he was cleverly attempting to evade taxes rather than standing 
by the strongly-held conviction he professed. Id, By failing to instruct the jury that the 
first prong of Carter's defense, that state taxable income is calculated based on federal 
taxable income, was an accurate statement of the law, the trial court left the impression 
that this prong of Carter's defense was premised on a false interpretation of tax law. Id.; 
see Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. 
This, in turn, prejudiced Carter by making his interpretation of tax law appear 
significantly more outrageous, thereby making it appear more likely his defense was 
simply a clever attempt to evade taxes rather than the result of a strongly-held belief that 
he did not owe any state income tax. Cf. Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Audit Division of 
the State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992) (holding "taxpayer can escape the 
penalty if he or she can show that he or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a 
legitimate, good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law" (citing Chicago Bridge 
& Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992)); Vermaxof Fla. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 906 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Moreover, the prejudice Carter suffered was not lessened by the fact that the 
16 
State's witness stated during cross-examination that a person cannot "have state taxable 
income" if he "has no federal taxable income." R. 274:97. Carter was entitled to have 
the legal principles on which his defense relied presented to the jury as binding principles 
of law rather than merely as statements of evidence the jury was free to disregard. See 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^21 ("A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the 
case to the jury and to have the jury instructed accordingly."); R. 274:140 (trial court 
instructing jury it has "duty to instruct you on the law and you are bound to follow it"); 
274:157 (trial court informing jury that it "has endeavored to give you instructions 
embodying all rules of law that may be necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful 
verdict"). He was also entitled to have the legal principles on which he relied clearly 
stated in the instructions rather than lost in the presentation of evidence. See Alonzo, 932 
P.2d at 615 (holding defendant has right to have his "'theory of the case presented to the 
jury in a clear and understandable way'" (citation omitted)). 
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY PRO SE DEFENDANT6 
Point #1. The trial court abused it's discretion when it refused to give some of my 
proposed jury instructions. This failure shows bias against me, on the part of the court, 
and constitutes prejudicial error. 
A. The trial court erred in denying my proposed jury instruction, which explained 
that state income tax liability is triggered by a person earning state taxable income, & not 
6
 See supra note 2, herein. 
7
 See addendum C for a signed copy of Carter's written arguments. His arguments were 
copied into the text of this brief in order to comply with the rules and for ease of the 
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triggered by someone who just earns wages that are not state taxable income, (see 
transcript, page 73 line 6 through page 74 line 15.) 
I believe the court further showed prejudice against me and against Utah Code, in 
comments made on page 74 lines 14 &15 of the court transcript, where the judge stated "I 
see no distinction between wages and income. Forty-nine is denied." 
Utah Code Section 59-10-112 defines state taxable income as: "State taxable 
income5 in the case of resident individual means his federal taxable income. . ." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-112. If state taxable income was defined simply as wages, salaries & 
tips earned in the state of Utah, I would never have stopped paying them. It is because of 
this definition and the fact that state income taxes are totally dependent upon federal 
taxable income, (see also Utah Code Section 59-10-102(1)), that I stopped paying state 
income taxes. 
B. The trial court erred in denying my jury instruction which explained that the 
prosecution had to prove that I knew that I was liable for payment of state income taxes, 
but sought to intentionally evade them. 
Point #2. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied my pre-trial motion to 
dismiss. This failure shows bias against me, on the part of the court and constitutes 
prejudicial error. 
A. The judge informed me that she did not have a copy of my motion to dismiss 
and indicated to me that she had never even read it. She denied my motion to dismiss 
having not even read it. This is at least partially preserved in the transcript of my motion 
Court. 
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to dismiss hearing, on page 6 lines 16 through 22. 
Point #3. Utah Code places the determination of what constitutes state taxable 
income, outside of state jurisdiction by defining state taxable income as federal taxable 
income. (Utah Code Section 59-10-112.) 
Point #4. My Constitutional right to due process has been violated, since the court 
and the prosecution assumed that I am liable for federal income taxes. At no point in 
time has it been demonstrated to me, and it was never demonstrated to the jury, that there 
is any law that created or creates an income tax liability on me, for federal income tax 
purposes. 
This would be necessary because of the fact that Utah Code Section 59-10-102(1) 
clearly establishes that the intent of the Utah tax code is: uto impose on each resident 
individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount of his 
'taxable income' for such year, as determined for federal income tax purposes,. . ." 
Point #5. The prosecution introduced a "certificate of lack of records" that they claimed 
they received from the IRS which said that the IRS could not locate federal income tax 
returns from me, for tax years 2001, 2002, & 2003. I had no prior warning that the state 
would alledge that I hadn't filed federal returns for these years, otherwise I would have 
had hard evidence with me, to prove that I not only did in fact file returns for these years, 
but that the IRS did in fact receive returns for those years as well. The introduction of 
this deceitful document may have destroyed my credibility in the eyes of the jurors and 
convinced them to find me guilty, even though I did in fact file a federal return for each 
of those 3 years, (see court transcript, page 134 lines 9-13.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above enumerated reasons, Carter respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED t h i s < ^ ^ d a y of May, 2006. 
JOSIE E. BRUMFIELD u 
Standby Counsel for Defendant/Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041905901 FS 
Judge: LESLIE A LEWIS 
Date: November 18, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: BAER, MARK W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIKORA, MICHAEL R 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 22, 1971 
Video 
CHARGES 
TAX EVASION - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 
TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony 




The Court orders Mr Carter to pay $10,125.00 restitution, $400.00 
recoupment fee, $2,500.00 fine plus interest/surcharge. 
The Court orders Mr Carter has remained indigent and was 
previously determined to be indigent. 
The Court orders the Legal Defendars Office is appointed to 
represent Mr Carter for the purposes of appeal. 
Case No: 041905901 
Date: Nov 18, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count 2 is to run concurrent with count 1. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Credit for time served of 64 days. 
SENTENCE FINE 








Total Principal Due 
Attorney Fees 






Amount: $400.00 Plus Interest 
LDA 
Case No: 041905901 
Date: Nov 18, 2 005 
Restitution Amount: $10125.00 
Pay in behalf of: UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Dated this \f) day of //2o
 0^ . <~ y 2 
,<y ......... ys\ 
- ^ xV / 
Of ********* >N Vf LESLIE A LEWIS ^<r 
District Court Judge 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of 




AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection ] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power Unenforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §5940-112 
KilQ-112- State taxable income of resident individual. 
"State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his federal 
M^blf income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with the modifications, 
ffiVactions, and adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114. The state 
^p&li income of a resident individual who is the beneficiary of an estate or 
tlrusf shall be modified by the adjustments provided in Section 59-10-209. 
JKstory: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 11; C. 1953, 
P944A-11; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 2, 
Tl73a995 t ch. 345, § 2. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1101 
PART 11 
TAXATION 
76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to 
revenue and taxation — Statute of limitations. 
(1) (a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are 
as provided in Subsections (1Kb) through (d). 
(b) (i) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a 
license or permit from the State Tax Commission, who operates 
without having registered or secured a license or permit, or who 
operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not 
current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection 
(l)(b)(i), the fine may not: 
(A) be less than $500; or 
(B) exceed $1,000. 
(c) (i) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of 
Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails 
to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any informa-
tion within the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or 
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies 
any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection 
(l)(c)(i), the fine may not: 
(A) be less than $1,000; or 
(B) exceed $5,000. 
(d) (i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or 
defeat any tax or the payment of a tax is, in addition to other penalties 
provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection 
(l)(d)(i), the fine may not: 
(A) be less than $1,500; or 
(B) exceed $25,000. 
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is 
the later of six years. 
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted, or 
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1101, enacted by L. in Subsection (l)(d)d), added "the later of" in 
1987, ch. 3, ^ 57; 2001, ch. 177, fc 2. the introductory paragraph in Subsection (2), 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- added Subsection (2Kb), and redesignated sub-
ment, effective July 1, 2001, substituted "re- sections and made related and stylistic 
quired by law" for "required under this title" m changes 
Subsection QKcKi), inserted "intentionally or" 
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